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Abstract: Climate change currently affects several states and their citizens around the globe. As 
sea-level-rise is threatening to make some states completely uninhabitable, small island states serve 
as examples of states at the greatest risk. This review essay analyzes three recent contributions to 
the literature on climate change and the future of endangered populations. These books offer timely 
contributions to the thinking about the prospects of not only threatened nations but also about the 
shape and content of global governance in the era of Anthropocene. The authors of the reviewed 
work suggest some interesting and novel innovations, particularly for updating the international leg-
islation surrounding climate governance. At the same time, given how unpredictable a process cli-
mate change is, the solutions we imagine to tackle it should perhaps be bolder.  
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“Adaptation for Kiribati is beyond our borders. Relocation is by far the only adaptation option, this 
is where migration with dignity comes in,” stated Anote Tong, the former president of Kiribati and 
one of the most vocal Pacific advocates, during his talk at the Pacific Island Development Forum in 
Suva on September 3, 2015.  The Pacific nations had gathered in Fiji to finalize their strategies for 1
the forthcoming Paris climate negotiations.  The mood before the Paris summit was optimistic and 2
the negotiations were expected to showcase “New Pacific Diplomacy.”  The islanders left for Paris 3
with great expectations and the outcome was considered a success.  Small island states succeeded in 4
having two of their most important climate goals drafted into the final document: article 8 on “loss 
and damage”  and a recommendation to limit temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius.  What 5 6
would happen next was dependent on more powerful countries abiding by their climate responsibili-
ties, for the first time being explicitly regulated and monitored by an international covenant.  7
The situation of small island states and other endangered populations under climate change is re-
ceiving an increasing amount of scholarly and public attention, quite deservedly so.  We have en8 -
tered into the era of the Anthropocene, a time in which threats to our planet are essentially of our 
own making.  The Anthropocene is a phase that Skillington describes as one of “radical inequality,” 9
one which requires new ways of thinking about global responsibilities.  Climate change will have 10
severe and irreversible consequences worldwide, with the most vulnerable societies and people be-
ing at the greatest risk. All the books discussed here are therefore timely contributions to this grow-
ing body of literature, and provide a thorough analysis of the various implications of the current 
climate crisis, with a particular focus on the fields of international politics and law.  
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In Gerrard and Wannier’s edited volume, a collection of articles from various climate change and 
law experts cover topics from climate immigration,  to relocation,  law of the sea,  accountabili11 12 13 -
ty,  and compensation.  The contributors evaluate the possibilities and limitations of the contem14 15 -
porary international order’s ability to respond to the threats that endangered island nations face. 
Stoutenburg, for her part, digs deeper into contemporary international law. She offers an indepth 
discussion of the legal framework, and then proposes solutions that would enable the threatened is-
land nations to continue their existence after the possible inundation of their territory. Skillington, 
finally, explores a wider theoretical framework for climate justice. She discusses not only endan-
gered populations but also offers a model of transnational climate justice from the perspective of 
human rights regimes.  16
All the authors have important things to say about global climate governance. Climate change, as 
they note, impacts not only the individual lives of those at the highest risk but also affects the future 
of entire political communities and generations, the shape of the international legal order, as well as 
global policies towards migration, human rights, security, and trade. Climate change creates unique 
threats that require new ways of thinking, especially in terms of the management of harmful conse-
quences. As it is impossible to address all the arguments and proposals presented in over a thousand 
pages of research, this article will concentrate on a few themes that are common throughout the lit-
erature under review. I will also suggest some future themes for studying the status of the endan-
gered populations. 
Law, politics, and the ethics of future climate governance 
The first overlapping theme is of course climate justice.  Successful climate governance faces not 17
only legal but political and moral obstacles as well, many of which are still greatly unsolved. In the 
words of Skillington: “Proposals to establish new international standards of democratic justice, as 
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well as a deliberative forum capable of addressing ... notably uneven quality in the distribution of 
the effects of global climate change, are routinely rejected on the grounds that such an authority 
would distort a perfectly legitimate, democratically founded state-centred normative order.”  What 18
is needed first and foremost, is a united political will to tackle the pressing climate matters and a 
global consensus on rules and regulations for achieving shared goals. All of the authors offer impor-
tant ideas on how climate justice could be better achieved through international cooperation. There 
is a pressing need, the authors agree across the board, for truly global solutions to the global prob-
lems created by climate change. In a sense, all the books share a cosmopolitan vision according to 
which those who can, ought to help those who are in need – regardless of where those in need are 
located – and that those who have contributed to climate harms the most should also bear the great-
est responsibilities. 
The second common theme derives directly from the first one. All the books depart from an as-
sumption that states are the key actors in achieving climate justice. What is discussed here is the 
inter-national management of the unwanted implications of climate change. Even Skillington, who 
begins her work by stating that what is needed is “an order of justice where national, regional, and 
global interests are treated together,”  and further calls for “justice for all subjected,”  spends most 19 20
of the book discussing states as the duty-bearers of global climate justice. Hence, climate justice 
debates seem unable to avoid the “problem of global justice”  and the unavoidability of thinking 21
climate justice in statist terms. 
The third unifying theme is the future. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time 
and climate-effected hazards have direct and irreversible consequences on people, property, busi-
ness, financial systems, and state institutions worldwide.  All the volumes under review are future-22
oriented and aim at offering a framework through which climate change implications could be ap-
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proached and problems eventually solved. By building on the present, the authors envision how the 
future could look and how the dangers could be sufficiently mitigated, if not reversed. 
The authors of all three books bring important and topical issues to the research agenda of climate 
justice, politics, and international law, yet they are unable to “think outside the box,” the most seri-
ous limitation being their focus on the current international legal framework. The consequences of 
climate change are uncertain. While acknowledging this, the authors seek guidance from the exist-
ing law and existing political status quo, despite the fact that we are not quite sure about the extent 
and severity of the events we are anticipating. 
Take the continuity of endangered states, discussed in all three books, as an example. Stoutenburg 
makes an attractive proposal on how the continuity of threatened small island states could be guar-
anteed by a moral (if not legal) duty of continuous recognition.  According to Stoutenburg, because 23
small island states have not themselves significantly contributed to their potential extinction, they 
should not be punished for the negative consequences of climate change either.   Maxine Burkett 24
(in Gerrard and Wannier) makes a similar proposal when she states that by accommodating a new 
category of “Nation ex-Situ,” a state on foreign territory, international legal order could take into 
account the needs of endangered nations in new territories.  Both authors imply that small island 25
states share a common “moral innocence” that has to be acknowledged in their future treatment as 
states and political communities. Moral innocence is a feature commonly attached to small island 
states, and actively employed as a strategy by these states themselves in international forums.  The 
leaders of small island states repetedly refer to themselves as the moral voice, thereby confirming 
the position of these states as the victims of negative climate impacts of which the international 
community is responsible.    26
Interestingly, by relying on the existing legal framework, the authors limit themselves from truly 
taking on the normative aspects of state-extinction  and its consequences for the international state 27
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system in the future. Proposals to relocate political communities to new territories within other sov-
ereign states corresponds poorly to the structure of the contemporary state system as it is currently 
regulated by contemporary international law.  In the Suva Declaration of September 2015, the Pa-
cific leaders urged the Conference of Parties in Paris to ensure “that human rights to exist as a peo-
ple are protected.”  Small island states are therefore calling for the right to continuous existence as 28
states (or, at least as "nations"). How could the international order protect “the human right to exist 
as a people” if and when this would require redrawing territorial boundaries and, ultimately, cause 
conflicting rights-claims between peoples? The potential and limitation of this proposal is not suffi-
ciently discussed in the work reviewed here, Stoutenburg’s proposal included. 
One particularly interesting and genuinely new idea for rethinking statehood that has been intro-
duced by the representatives of small island states, but not explored in these volumes, is the concept 
of a “large/big oceanic state.”  According to the islanders, their countries should not be perceived 29
as “small states” at all but, instead, as large states with significant oceanic territories. While the 
books touch upon the rights over maritime and exclusive economic zones in the future, none of the 
writers contemplate the idea of statehood at sea. As with the question of continuous existence on 
another state's territory, the idea of a large oceanic state also begs us to ask how the international 
state system could respond to or substantiate the idea. The question goes to the very heart of the in-
ternational politics of statehood by challenging the idea of the sovereign state as being bound by 
territory on land. The role of small island states might therefore be more significant than their size 
or the scale of climate threats would suggest, insofar as their possible futures force us to find solu-
tions not only to climate change mitigation and adaptation but also to the overall structure of the 
international state system. 
On a related note, whereas the future of jurisdictional maritime zones is touched upon in both 
Stoutenburg and the articles in Gerrard and Wennier, the importance of fisheries and other forms of 
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"blue economy" are not sufficiently addressed in these works, and definitely should have been, es-
pecially in the Gerrard and Wannier chapters.  In the words of the former president of the Sey30 -
chelles, the "blue economy" is "about the sustainable use of the sea to meet human needs.”  The 31
idea of a "large oceanic state" is directly linked to the authority over maritime revenues. Almost all 
endangered island nations have a significant fishing industry. The South Pacific region, for instance, 
produces roughly half of the world’s skipjack tuna supply. They therefore have obvious national 
interests in securing the rights over these revenues for the years to come.   32
As is always the case in international politics—of which international law, law-making, and the 
state system are all essential parts—only political practice reveal how the global governance will 
materialize. The future scenarios of small island states are yet to be seen as well. All political prac-
tice, international law included, is about the choices and preferences of relevant actors (predomi-
nantly powerful states). I believe that all of the reviewed books would have benefitted from the cre-
ation of tighter analytical connections to international politics beyond climate governance. How the 
future of international law with regards to the endangered nations will look like depends on the po-
litical decisions made and strategies applied by the actors involved.  Fisheries serve as an impor33 -
tant example here, as it is the case that it is not only endangered island states that hold interests in 
the exploitation of these vast maritime resources.  
Jonathon Barnett accurately points out in his recent article that “normalizing the loss of atoll coun-
tries” in scholarly and political practice might also be harmful to both the endangered nations them-
selves and climate governance in general. Instead of the language and politics of desperation, Bar-
nett thus argues that we should aim at developing a more hopeful imagery of the future of these 
states.  In addition to politics, then, the future of small island states and other endangered political 34
communities is also dependent on predominant normativity. 
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All of the studies would thus have benefited from a wider comparative perspective, whether in re-
gional, disciplinary, or theoretical terms. It has become evident through my own research in differ-
ent regions that survival strategies between the countries in the South Pacific and the Maldives in 
the Indian Ocean vary significantly,  and even in the case of the Pacific, Tong’s conviction that re35 -
location is the only strategy is not shared by all. Hence, the solution that might fit one or two states 
might not work for other endangered nations.  This kind of case sensitivity is of course hard to 36
achieve if one looks at the situation of small island states and solutions to their hardship from the 
perspective of international law and the state system alone, for the simple reason that international 
law is based on the assumption of equality among nation states that itself limits the exceptions to 
the rule and alternative imaginaries. 
In a similar vein, while climate change is obviously a global phenomenon and demands global solu-
tions, regional perspectives and independent actors should not be sidelined, as effective climate 
change adaptation and mitigation can only be accomplished on the ground. In order to efficiently 
tackle climate threats, it seems to me that the global cannot proceed without the local. Here, the 
knowledge produced by disciplines such as regional anthropology is crucially important. Skilling-
ton, for instance, tries to offer a model for global governance of climate harms by relying on a pre-
dominantly cosmopolitan framework without taking into account the possibility of truly regional 
solutions. Legal scholar Jane McAdam has in her work on forced migration noted that all the South 
Pacific nations share a nomad history. Given the background of these societies, then, contemplating 
their relocation might be fruitless in the first place.  Perhaps what we are about to see are some 37
forms of truly stateless regional arrangements instead. 
After Paris, before the Anthropocene 
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All of the volumes were written before the Paris Agreement came into force, a document that not 
only goes further from the existing United Nations climate documents in identifying specific re-
sponsibilities related to climate change but that was also ratified exceptionally quickly by the ma-
jority of world states, including the big polluters such as the United States and China.  As I pointed 38
out in the first part of this article, the Paris Agreement offered hope to endangered nations that their 
situation will finally be taken seriously by international society. Did the Paris Agreement truly offer 
mechanisms for more effective climate governance, especially from the perspective of international 
law? What the agreement does offer is explicit commitments by countries to decrease their emis-
sions and to report their progress regularly. How will these commitments transfer to the effective 
global governance of climate change and, eventually, to a more just international order? It would be 
interesting to see how the discussions in the books would have developed had the authors had the 
knowledge of the outcome and aftermath of the Paris negotiations. 
In November 2017, Fiji, one of the small island states, will chair the Concert of Parties meeting in 
Bonn, Germany.  The ball is now not only in the Fijian court, but in the court of the small island 39
states as a group, as they play a leading role in the global fight against climate change. It is a battle 
that involves scholars, practitioners, citizens, and states alike, both locally and globally. Small is-
land states have proven their capacity to actively frame international debate and political agenda 
before.  Despite their small size, they have been extraordinarily successful in bringing their inter40 -
ests into international negotiation tables, “loss and damage” being the latest example. We should not 
therefore undermine the soft power these states entertain, even under the circumstances in which 
some more powerful players, most importantly the United States under the Trump administration, 
are refusing to take the lead in the global fight against climate change. In the words of Prime Minis-
ter Voreque Bainimarama of Fiji, “we who are most vulnerable must be heard, whether we come 
from the Pacific or other Small Island Developing States, other low lying nations and states or 
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threatened cities in the developed world like Miami, New York, Venice or Rotterdam. But together 
we must speak out for the whole world—every global citizen—because no-one, no matter who they 
are or where they live, will ultimately escape the impact of climate change.”   The books reviewed 41
here offer important food for thought in the journey ahead. 
University of Tampere , Tampere, Finland      
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